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NOTES
TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION IN BIOCHEMICAL
TESTING FOR AIDS AND MARIJUANA
The acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and drug abuse
in the workplace are the subjects of relentless media and government
scrutiny.1 As of early 1987, public health officials had reported over
30,000 cases of AIDS in the United States.2 By the end of 1987, at least
one million Americans probably had been exposed to the fatal disease.3
The associated health insurance costs4 and productivity losses5 will have
1. See, eg., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG
ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1986); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (1986) (providing current medical information to the
American public); The AIDS Threat: Who's at Risk?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 1988, at 42 (outlining
Drs. Masters, Johnson and Kolodny's pessimistic projections regarding of the spread of AIDS into
the heterosexual community); The AIDS Conflict, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 18 (describing
how ignorance about the disease is causing an epidemic of fear in the population); Officials in Discord
Over U.S. Proposal for AIDS Virus Test, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1987, at A19, col. I (Federal proposal
to administer test for AIDS virus to anyone admitted to a hospital or applying for a marriage license
causes confidentiality concerns.); Altman, New Fear on Drug Use and AIDS, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6,
1986, at 1, col. 2 (Intravenous drug use is prime cause of AIDS infection among heterosexuals in
America.).
2. See Francis & Chin, The Prevention ofAcquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United
States: An Objective Strategy for Medicine, Public Health, Business, and the Community, 257 J.
A.M.A. 1357, 1357 (1987).
3. Id.
4. Insurance companies contend that people exposed to the AIDS virus "are likely to have
higher health care costs" than the rest of society. Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social
Policy, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 237 (1986). Claire Wolkoff of the American Academy
of Actuaries summarized the insurance industry's position on AIDS testing: "If America's private
voluntary-insurance system is to remain workable, AIDS tests must be allowed so the disease can be
underwritten in the same manner as heart disease, cancer, or alcohol and drug abuse.... The
alternative is to spread the risk factor over the whole population, thus raising the price of insurance
for everyone." Remove Stigma From AIDS Test: An Insurer's View, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at
A34, col. 4.
As the number of AIDS cases and the cost of treatment increase, there may be growing pressure
on state governments to allow insurers to test for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) antibo-
dies and to exclude carriers from coverage. See Gostin, The Nucleus of a Public Health Strategy to
Combat AIDS 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 226, 229 (1986); Comment, AIDS and Insurance:
The Rationale For AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. Rv. 1806, 1814-17 (1987).
5. The loss of productivity of people exposed to HIV will vary depending on the stage of the
infection. Patients with AIDS-Related Complex (ARC), infected with HIV but not suffering from
full-blown AIDS, suffer from specific signs and symptoms. These diagnostic markers include "per-
sistent fevers, diarrhea, anorexia (loss of appetite), weight loss, and malaise not due to other underly-
ing illnesses" as well as progressive generalized lymphadenopathy (enlarged lymph glands that have
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a significant impact on the private sector. Likewise, the Research Trian-
gle Institute estimates that substance abuse on the job costs the economy
as much as forty-six billion dollars in 1980.6 Federal experts estimate
that between ten percent and twenty-three percent of workers use drugs
on the job.7
In response to mounting publicity and concern, increasing numbers
of private employers have implemented biochemical testing to screen em-
ployees for drug use and for the presence of AIDS.8 Employers and in-
surers will probably also make great use of similar tests for AIDS in
coming years. Courts and employers, however, should interpret these
biochemical tests with caution. Although facially neutral, biochemical
tests may discriminate against groups protected by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.9
Title VII, in addition to banning intentional discrimination, prohib-
its facially neutral employment practices that have a disparate impact on
grown progressively larger in scattered areas of the body). Mayer, The Clinical Challenges of AIDS
and HIV Infection, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 281, 282 (1986).
Once full-blown AIDS develops, the patient may suffer from a variety of opportunistic infec-
tions, which take advantage of the patient's depressed immune system. The most common of these
infections is the Pneumocystic carinif pneumonia, the most frequent cause of death among AIDS
patients. Opportunistic neoplasms such as Kaposi's sarcoma and certain lymphomas also may im-
pair worker health. Id. at 282-83.
Another severe impairment of productivity will come from the development of HIV neurologic
disease ("AIDS encephalopathy"). HIV proliferates in nerve cells of the brain, spinal cord and
peripheral nerves, causing a variety of neurologic diseases. Id at 283-84 see also Snider, Simpson,
Nielson, Gold, Metroka & Posner, Neurological Complications of Immune Deficiency Syndrome:
Analysis of 50 Patients, 14 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 403, 403-04 (1983). The frequency of this
progressive encephalopathy, in which "dementia and motor dysfunction predominate," is "presently
uncertain, but it may eventually afflict the majority of AIDS patients." Navia, Cho, Petito & Price,
The AIDS Dementia Complex" 1 Neuropathology, 19 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 525, 525 (1986); see
Epstein, Sharer, Joshi, Fojas, Koenigsberger & Oleske, Progressive Encephalopathy in Children with
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 17 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 488, 496 (1985) ("progressive
encephalopathy may represent an early feature of AIDS in children"). Early findings of the demen-
tias include impaired memory and visual-spacial orientation. Mayer, supra, at 283-84.
6. H. HARWOOD, D. NAPOLITANO, P. KRISTIANSEN & J. COLLINS, ECONOMIC COSTS TO
SOCIETY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1980, at 3 (Research Triangle
Inst. 1984); see also Cohen, Drugs in the Workplace, 45 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Dec. 1984, pt. 2,
at 4, 4 (1984) ("Metropolitian Life Insurance Company estimates the direct costs to industry at $85
billion a year.").
7. Battling the Enemy Within: Companies Fight to Drive Illegal Drugs Out of the Workplace,
TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 53.
8. See The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 57 (percentage of For-
tune 500 companies screening applicants rose from 10% in 1982 to nearly 30% in 1985); Noel
Dunivant & Assocs., Drug Testing in Major Corporations: A Survey of the Fortune 500, at 4, 6
(October, 1985) (conducted for Compuchem Laboratories) (finding that of 180 Fortune 500 firms
interviewed, 18% acknowledged testing procedures and another 19% stated that they anticipated
the implementation of biotesting within the next two years)..
9. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
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persons of a particular race, national origin, sex, or religion.10 Under the
disparate impact theory, a plaintiff need only prove a significant disparate
impact to establish a prima facie claim; an intention to discriminate is not
a necessary element.I1 Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer
must justify the employment practice. 12
Judicial decisions dealing with disparate impact may be separated
into two categories: those dealing with selection tests and those dealing
with selection policies. This distinction is important: if biochemical test-
ing is classified as a selection policy, an employer need only articulate a
single nondiscriminatory reason for the policy. Selection tests, however,
are given more stringent scrutiny by reviewing courts.1 3 Because bio-
chemical tests are to some degree inherently inaccurate, it is possible that
they discriminate on a chemical level.' 4 Thus, biochemical tests have the
same potential to discriminate as other professionally developed tests.
Consequently, biochemical tests are most appropriately analyzed under
the testing strand of disparate impact doctrine.
This note argues that a disparate impact analysis must distinguish
between the accuracy of a biochemical test and the policy the test may be
intended to enforce.15 An employer seeking to justify a discriminatory
biochemical test should follow a two-part method of validation. First,
the employer should offer specific evidence verifying the accuracy of the
test. The best way to ensure the accuracy of biochemical testing is to
follow initial screening tests with a confirmation test.16 The employer
who verifies the accuracy of a biochemical test greatly curtails the poten-
tial for biochemical discrimination. Second, after establishing the accu-
racy of the test, the employer should validate the biochemical test under
the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (the Uniform
Guidelines) as promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
10. Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("[Title VII] proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 79-103 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 79-112 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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Commission (EEOC).' 7
Part I of this note reviews the inherent inaccuracies of biochemical
testing, suggesting that screening tests must be followed by confirmation
tests.' 8 Part II reviews the disparate impact theory of employment dis-
crimination. 19 Part III suggests how biochemical testing might be impli-
cated in disparate impact analysis.20 Part IV discusses the different
standards of validation under the two strands of disparate impact doc-
trine and distinguishes employee selection tests from employee selection
policies that may be implemented through testing.2' The section argues
that courts must require employers to justify biochemical tests on the
basis of their accuracy and job-relatednesss. Part V proposes a reproduc-
ible standard for validating biochemical tests using the Uniform Guide-
lines. The section concludes that employers must ensure the accuracy of
biochemical tests by using high cutoff scores and confirmation tests.22
I. THE INHERENT INACCURACY OF BIOCHEMICAL TESTING
The validity of biochemical testing originates in the often fallible
objectivity of scientific measurement. In order to consider more fully
how a court should treat a biochemical test under a disparate impact
analysis, this section first reviews the inherently inaccurate nature of bio-
chemical testing.
A. Screening Tests.
Most biochemical tests begin with a screening test that is highly sen-
sitive, but not highly specific.23 Common screening tests for marijuana in
the workplace are the radioimmunoassay (RIA) and the enzyme-multi-
plied immunoassay technique (EMIT). 24 A commonly used AIDS
17. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(B) (1987).
18. See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text. -=
19. See infra notes 39-66 and accompanying text. r,
20. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text. J
21. See infra notes 79-112 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
23. See DiGregorio & Sterling, Marijuana Pharmacology and Urine Testing, 35 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 209, 211-12 (1987); Evans, Legal Issues in Alcohol and Drug Detection Programs, 4
SYVA MONITOR, Spring 1986, at 1, 3; Gold & Dackis, Role of the Laboratory in the Evaluation of
Suspected Drug Abuse, 47 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Jan. 1986, supp. 1, at 17, 21-22; Morgan,
Problems of Mass Urine Screenings for Misused Drugs, 16 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 305, 305-06
(1984). For a discussion of AIDS screening tests, see Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, Screening for HIV
Infection: Risks, Benefits, and the Burden of Proof 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 260-64
(1986).
24. See DiGregorio & Sterling, supra note 23, at 211-12; Gold & Dackis, supra note 23, at 19,
21.
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screening test is the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA).2"
One problem with screening tests is that they are inferential: they
only detect the chemical by-products, or metabolites, of drugs or the
AIDS virus, not the drug or virus itself.26 Other substances have the
same molecular shape as the by-products of marijuana and the AIDS
virus; screening tests cannot differentiate between these "cross-reactive"
impostors and the by-products of the AIDS virus or drugs. Cross-reac-
tive substances fit the molecular "keyhole" of a biochemical test and
cause a "false positive."' 27 For example, one form of the EMIT will
falsely register positive for marijuana when a common pain reliever,
ibuprofen, is present in urine.28
The high sensitivity of marijuana screening tests is also problematic.
A urine test detects minute quantities of marijuana by-products in the
urine. Whether the amount detected represents a "positive" result de-
pends solely on the arbitrary setting of a "cutoff level."'29 When metabo-
lites detected are in excess of this predetermined cutoff level the result is
25. See Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 23, at 260.
26. See iad; Willette, Interpreting Cannabinoid Assay Results, 4 SYVA MONrrOR, Winter 1986,
at 1, 1-2; Gold & Dackis, supra note 23, at 20-21; Morgan, supra note 23, at 306, 309.
27. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 23, at 20-21. Cross-reactions occur when compounds
are chemically similar to drugs the test is designed to detect. Screening methods such as RIA and
EMIT test for the presence of marijuana through an inferential chain of roughly five steps: 1) a
urine sample is added to a cloudy bacterial suspension containing a drug-enzyme complex and a
drug antibody; 2) the drug antibody binds to the drug-enzyme complex and inactivates the enzyme;
3) if the drug is also present in the urine sample, however, some of the antibody will bind to that free
drug, rather than to the drug-enzyme complex, and the enzyme will remain active; 4) the active
enzyme dissolves bacterial cell walls, and causes the cloudy bacterial suspension to become clear; 5)
measuring the turbity of solution enables detection of the drug in the urine sample. See Morgan,
supra note 23, at 306-08.
28. SYVA recently informed its client laboratories that the EMIT d.a.u. and EMIT st Cannabi-
noid 20 ng Assay, which use the enzyme malate dehydrogenase (MDH), could cross-react with the
anti-inflammatory drugs ibuprofen (used in such nonprescription drugs as Motrin), naproxen
(Naprosyn), and fenoprofen (Nalfon). Letters from SYVA to client laboratories (Feb., Mar. & July,
1986). In other words, a person taking Motrin, Naprosyn or Nalfon might have a positive EMIT
urine test for marijuana even though the person had not been exposed to marijuana.
29. See DiGregorio & Sterling, supra note 23, at 212; Willette, supra note 26, at 2. Depending
on the selected cutoff levels, EMIT may register positive days after marijuana use. Id. at 2. If a
cutoff level of 100 ng/ml is used, it is unlikely that a person would remain positive in the EMIT
d.a.u. or EMIT st for more than three days after using a moderate amount of marijuana. If the
cutoff is lowered to 20 ng/ml, the EMIT d.a.u. results may remain positive for two to seven days
after the smoking of a single marijuana cigarette (containing about 120 mg of tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC)). Id. (citing Bastiani, Urinary Cannabinoid Excretion Patterns, in THE CANNABINOIDS:
CHEMICAI, PHARMACOLOGIC, AND THERAPEUTIC ASPECTS 263-80 (S. Agurell, W. Dewey & R.
Willette eds. 1984)). Other studies report positive results with 20 ng/ml EMIT d.a.u. from 4 to 47
days (with occasional positive results for an additional period of up to 77 days in the case of heavy
(daily) marijuana users). Id at 3 (citing Ellis, Mann, Judson, Schramm & Tashchian, Excretion
Patterns of Cannabinoid Metabolites After Last Use in a Group of Chronic Users 38 CLINICAL PHAR-
MACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 572 (1985)).
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considered positive; a very low cutoff level may yield a positive result for
marijuana over a month after ingestion.30 Moreover, an EMIT test with
a low cutoff level may. indicate a positive result when an employee has
had only passive exposure to marijuana; an employee could test positive
by unintentionally inhaling the marijuana smoke of those around her,31
just as non-smokers passively inhale the cigarette smoke of others. Fur-
ther, due to the fat-soluble nature of marijuana metabolites, urine screen-
ing tests may continue to show a positive result when metabolites leach
out of fat cells long after actual intoxication. 32 A marijuana screening
test, therefore, cannot measure impairment; it can only inferentially mea-
sure ingestion.
Thus, courts and employers cannot rely on screening tests alone as
an indicator of drug use that might compromise job performance. Be-
cause of cross-reactivity and oversensitivity, positive results in a screen-
ing test will often have no relationship to impairment or, more
importantly, job performance. One way to improve the accuracy of
screening tests is to raise the cutoff level, but the problem of cross-reac-
30. See DiGregorio & Sterling, supra note 23, at 210; Willette, supra note 26, at 1. A major
problem with urine tests is that they do not distinguish the presence of drugs that have been ingested
recently from drugs that have been present in the body for a longer period of time. This problem is
especially severe in marijuana testing. See id., at 1. THC, the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana,
is a soluble drug and may be stored in the fat cells and later released over a period of several days or
weeks. Screening tests for THC remain positive while THC leaches out of the fat cells. See iL This
phenomenon is particularly striking for chronic users of marijuana, who have large amounts of THC
stored in their fat cells. One chronic user had positive test results eleven weeks after discontinuing
all use of marijuana. Id. The typical screening test for non-chronic users will remain positive for
one to three days. Cohen, supra note 6, at 7.
31. See Cone, Johnson, Darwin, Yousefnejad, Mell, Paul & Mitchell, Passive Inhalation of
Marajuana Smoke Urinalysis and Room Air Levels of Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol, 11 J. ANA-
LYTICAL TOXICOLOGY, 89, 95-96 (1987) (concluding that passive inhalation of marijuana smoke can
lead to excretion of detectable levels of cannabinoids in urine); Cone & Johnson, Contact Highs and
Urinary Cannabinoid Excretion After Passive Exposure to Marijuana Smoke, 40 CLINICAL PHARMA-
COLOGY & THERAPEuTICS 247, 255 (1986) (Passive exposure to 16-marijuana cigarettes for one
hour each day for six days produced urine drug levels ranging from 20 ng/ml to as much as 100 ng/
ml; cutoff level for a positive result was 20 ng/ml.); see also Mason, Perez-Reyes, McBay & Foltz,
Cannabinoids in Plasma After Passive Inhalation of Marijuana Smoke, 249 J. A.M.A. 475, 476
(1986) (letter to editor describing findings of low level THC concentrations in passive exposed sub-
jects, but noting distinguishable differences between active and passive exposures). But see Willette,
supra note 26, at 3-5 (deemphasizing the importance of passive inhalation).
32. See DiGregorio & Sterling, supra note 23, at 212; Willette, supra note 26, at 2-5. John P.
Morgan, M.D., states that the presence of marijuana in the urine does not correlate with actual
intoxication. Marijuana persists in the blood and urine long after the period of intoxication ends.
Morgan, supra note 23, at 306. Measuring actual intoxication is important since a criterion-related
validity study would need to correlate positive test results with measurable criteria such as error rate.
Some experts have proposed that one way to improve measurement of intoxication is by monitoring
brain waves. Herzfeld, Brain Scans on the Job, AM. HEALTH, Jul.-Aug. 1986, at 72, 74-76. A
preliminary brain wave test has been designed. Id
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tivity remains. Only confirmation tests come close to eliminating both
oversensitivity and cross-reactivity.
B. Confirmation Tests.
Confirmation tests eliminate much of the inaccuracy in biochemical
testing and are more specific than screening tests.33 They tend to locate
false positives and confirm the initial readings of a screening test only
when a true positive is present. The most effective confirmation test for
drug testing is gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS), a test
so precise that it is often called "molecular fingerprinting."3 4 The most
common test to confirm an initial positive for the AIDS virus is the
Western blot assay.35
33. In other words, they tend to register positive only when the biochemical measured is pres-
ent. For example, the generally accepted process used to detect marijuana is to administer a screen-
ing test. Positive results may be confirmed with the more specific gas chromatography-mass
spectrometry (GC-MS) test. Evans, supra note 23, at 3; Gold & Dackis, supra note 23, at 21-22.
34. Gold & Dackis, supra note 23, at 21. Gas chromatography (GC) employs an expensive
instrument called a chromatographer. At a given temperature and pressure, identical compounds,
such as molecules of a particular drug, will travel through a spiral column at the same speed, since
their interaction with the column packing is the same. Molecules of different compounds such as
marijuana and cocaine, by contrast, will travel down the column at different speeds, thereby allowing
differentiation and classification. Id
The "sifting" process occurs in the chromatographer, while the classification process occurs in
the mass-spectrometer (MS). After passing through the GC, the molecules are subjected to a bar-
rage of high-energy particles designed to fragment the marijuana molecule. A marijuana molecule
will break apart in a characteristic way because not all of the bonds holding its atoms together have
the same strength. See id. The presence of a drug in the urine is confirmed if the fragmentation
pattern of a molecule in the sample matches that of the drug sought to be detected. Id.; Interview
with Robert G. Kaley, Ph.D., Analytical Chemist, Monsanto Chemicals, Inc. (Aug. 4, 1986) (dis-
cussing high specificity and sensitivity of GC-MS).
The GC-MS is the preferred test for confirming the presence of marijuana or marijuana metabo-
lites. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (D.D.C. 1986); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp.
226, 229 (W.D. Ky. 1985). Notably, however, even the GC-MS test is based on biochemical infer-
ence rather than observation.
35. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 23, at 260 (Western blot assay is not practical for
large-scale screening because it is labor-intensive; it is used to confirm positive antibody tests
designed for mass screening.); see also Essex, Allen, Kanki, McLane, Malone, Kitchen & Lee, Anti-
gens of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 103 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 700, 701 (1985) (Western blot test, under certain circumstances, "can be a valuable
confirmatory assay."); Gershoni & Palade, Protein Blotting: Principles and Applications, 131 ANA-
LYTICAL BIOCHEM. 1, 3 (1983) (explaining the protein blotting process).
In the Western blot assay, HIV proteins grown in a tissue culture are separated into component
proteins and "blotted" onto special paper. A blood sample is added, and any antibody present in the
blood is "sandwiched" by a radioactive antibody probe. Antibody complexes are detected either by
exposing the paper to X-ray film, creating "hotspots," or by adding the enzyme's substrate to the
antibody complex, causing a color reaction. The Western blot test also generates "hotspots" concen-
trated in bands, allowing more precise detection of specific HIV proteins. The Western blot assay,
however, is more expensive and more labor-intensive than the ELISA mass-screening test. Barry,
Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 23, at 260.
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Employers, however, do not always use confirmation tests because
they usually are more expensive and more labor-intensive than screening
tests.3 6 Nonetheless, use of confirmation testing can only benefit an em-
ployer. A truly job-related, nondiscriminatory test will deter frivolous
litigation and contribute to safety, efficiency, and profit maximization in
the workplace.37 Many courts have required that screening tests be fol-
lowed by confirmation tests.38
II. THE DISPARAT]E IMPACT THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
Congress intended that Title VII eliminate employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.39 In the semi-
nal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40 the Supreme Court set forth a
theory of employment discrimination under Title VII known as "dispa-
rate impact. 41 The disparate impact theory seeks to remedy the effect of
past discrimination and to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment."'42
Since the Griggs decision was handed down, however, disparate im-
pact doctrine has been less than coherent. Issues as basic as what weight
a court should give the Uniform Guidelines remain unresolved. 43 More-
over, lower courts recognize a variety of methods for establishing a prima
facie claim of disparate impact.44 More important, Griggs itself uses sev-
eral different phrases to describe the standard of an employer's business
justification.4 5 The most recent point of contention involves the question
of whether the scope of disparate impact testing includes subjective hir-
36. See Rust, Drug Testing: The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 50, 52 (One
company charges from $100 to $200 per specimen for a confirmatory GC-MS test.).
37. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
38. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 4t 1507 ("[Tlermination of plaintiff's employment on
the basis of an unconfirmed EMIT test was arbitrary and capriciois."); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F.
Supp. at 232 (inmates entitled to preliminary injunction against disciplinary actions by corrections
officials based on unconfirmed EMIT test for marijuana); see also Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp.
1214, 1221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Unconfirmed EMIT urine test results for marijuana are unreliable
enough to warrant challenge to drug testing program designed by New York prison officials.)
39. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (language of statute at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982)).
40. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
41. Id. at 429-36. "The Act proscribes... practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation." Id. at 431.
42. Id. at 431-32.
43. See 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 75.60-.65 (1987).
44. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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ing practices. 46
In Griggs, the Supreme Court ruled that employment practices hav-
ing a disparate impact on a protected class violate the prohibitions of
Title VII unless the employer can show that the selection device is "job-
related." 47 Before the effective date of Title VII in 1965, Duke Power
hired blacks only to work in its labor department.4 8 After the enactment
of Title VII, Duke Power abandoned its policy of overt discrimination
and substituted testing procedures. The company required that appli-
cants to departments other than labor have a high school diploma or that
they achieve satisfactory scores on written aptitude tests.49 The plaintiffs
argued that although these requirements applied equally to blacks and
whites, they disproportionately excluded blacks from hiring and promo-
tion. 0 The Court found that Duke Power was unable to justify the em-
ployment practices.51
Griggs and its progeny5 2 set forth the core of current disparate im-
pact doctrine. There are two steps that must be satisfied. First, a plain-
tiff must make a prima facie showing that a facially neutral selection
procedure has a disparate impact on his or her protected group.53 To
establish a significant discriminatory effect, plaintiffs usually produce sta-
tistical data. For example, the Griggs Court relied on evidence that 12%
of black males and 34% of white males held high school diplomas in
North Carolina, and on an unrelated EEOC finding that only 6% of
46. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 808 n.17 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
47. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
48. Id. at 427. Duke Power organized its Dan River, N.C. plant into five departments: (1)
labor, (2) coal handling, (3) operations, (4) maintenance, and (5) laboratory and test. Black employ-
ees brought the action in Griggs because the highest paying jobs in the labor department paid less
than the lowest paying jobs in the other four "operating" departments. Id.
49. Id. at 427-28. The tests were the Wonderlic Personnel Test, which measures intelligence,
and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Id. at 428.
50. Id. at 429-30. Rejecting the denial of the claims by lower courts, Chief Justice Burger
reasoned that lower scofi& on intelligence tests were traceable to the effects of past discrimination,
such as'inferior educatioti and segregation. Id. at 430.
51. Id at 431-32. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification." lI at 431. An employer could justify the
practice only if it was a "business necessity" or was "related to job performance." Id. Good intent
could not exonerate a practice if it operated as a "built-in headwind[ ]." Id. at 432.
52. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-56 (1981) (holding that a higher percent-
age of black candidates being promoted than white candidates does not preclude blacks from making
prima facie case of disparate impact nor does it provide defendant with a defense); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (even if job-relatedness shown, plaintiff may prevail by
demonstrating test is a "pretext" for discrimination).
53. See 401 U.S. at 430 ("Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face,
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices.").
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blacks, but 58% of whites, had passed the disputed tests.54
The statistical approach used in Griggs is instructive but not bind-
ing. Although the Supreme Court extensively discussed the many issues
associated with statistical evidence of employment discrimination in Ha-
zelwood School District v. United States, 55 it has yet to endorse a particu-
lar statistical method for showing a prima facie claim of disparate
impact.5 6 The lower federal courts recognize several methods of statisti-
cal proof, most notably the two-tailed test of standard deviation and the
80% rule.57
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie claim of disparate im-
pact, the second step of the Griggs analysis follows. In this step, the
defendant assumes the burden of justifying the employment practice in
question.58 What justifies an employment practice is not entirely clear,
although Griggs appears to require that an employer justify an employ-
ment practice by showing that it is "job-related." 59 In subsequent deci-
sions, however, the Court has emphasized the Griggs language requiring
an employer to show the "business necessity" of an employment prac-
tice.60 In cases not involving objective tests, the Court has not required
54. Id. at 430 & n.6.
55. 433 U.S. 299, 307-13 (1977) (holding that the proper statistical comparison was between the
racial composition of the school district's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified
public school teacher population in the relevant labor market, not the racial composition of the
student population).
56. See generally 3 A. LARSON, supra note 43, § 74 (discussion of methods of proof).
57. See Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 658 nn.8-9 (Ist Cir. 1985) (50%
statistical significance test); Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251, 256 n.8 (8th Cir. 1985)
(80% test); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 356-57 (8th Cir.
1980) (80% test); see also G. KIMBLE, How TO USE (AND MISUSE) STATISTICS 116-18 (1978)
(explaining why standard deviation is a representative measure of variability); Meier, Sacks & Zabell,
What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139, 167-68 (1984) (arguing that the 80% rule should be favored over the
imprecise Hazelwood rule); Kaye, The Numbers Game: Statistical Inference in Discrimination Cases;
80 MICH. L. REV. 833, 83941 (1982) (reviewing D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF
DISCRIMINATION (1980) and noting fallacies in Hazelwood approach)",
58. 401 U.S. at 432.
59. Id. at 431.
60. Id. at 433-36 & n.9 (Court cited EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures and
treated them "as expressing the will of Congress."). The EEOC issued its first employment guide-
lines in 1966 as the Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures. The first procedures were not
codified, however. In 1970, the EEOC published the EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection that
superseded and enlarged the 1966 guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1971). "The guidelines ... are
based on the belief that properly validated and standardized employee selection criteria can signifi-
cantly contribute to the implementation of non-discriminatory personnel policies, as required by
Title VII." Id. § 1607.1. The regulations detailed testing and validation procedures that differ sig-
nificantly from the present guidelines in their emphasis on criterion-related validation. The original
guidelines also prohibited use of validated tests in two circumstances on which the new Uniform
Guidelines are much less rigorous. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 43, § 75.52.
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strict validation at all.61
The Griggs Court accorded "great deference" to the old EEOC
Guidelines as a method for validating employee selection tests; 62 Duke
Power was required to "validate" the test under a method based primar-
ily on the old EEOC Guidelines.63 More recently, the Supreme Court
has retreated from strict reliance on the EEOC Guidelines." The Guide-
lines as they existed when the Court decided Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody imposed a harsh burden on employers;65 the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have explored other, more workable validation
methods for tests and for non-test devices, typically relying indirectly on
Some employers were subject to both the EEOC Guidelines and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCC) Guidelines, 60 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1977), which were similar to the old EEOC
Guidelines on a number of points, differing primarily on the issue of presentation of the evidence of
validation and sanctions available for violation of the OFCC Guidelines. See 3 A. LARSON, supra
note 43, § 75.52, at 15-26 to -27. The OFCC regulations applied to contractors and subcontractors
of the U.S. government and were administered by the Department of Labor, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3
(1977), while the EEOC Guidelines applied to employers covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and were administered by the EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(c). See EEOC, COORDINA-
TION OF FEDERAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS: THE FIRST YEAR 1978-1979,
at 3 (Aug. 1979). The resulting conflict between the two sets of regulations led to the formation in
1972 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordination Council. Id After several years the
Council, whose functions were eventually tranferred to the EEOC, successfully consolidated the two
sets of testing guidelines into the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607 (1979). The Uniform Guidelines essentially require employers to examine their selection
processes for adverse impacts of discrimination and, if adverse impacts are found, to either: (1)
eliminate the adverse impact; (2) validate the impact and search for new alternatives; or (3) other-
wise justify the procedure under federal law. See EEOC, supra, at 3; see also Adoption of Questions
and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11,996 (1979).
61. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977) (To survive Title VII chal-
lenge, discriminatory employment practice must be "necessary to safe and efficient job perform-
ance."). This case really involved a measurement of height and weight; perhaps this factor explains
why the Court refused to allow the low standards of business justification entailed in the non-testing
strand.
62. See, eg., Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 (finding that the
legitimate goals of safety and efficiency justified defendant's drug-related hiring policy).
63. 401 U.S. at 433 n.9 (interpreting professional nature of "professionally developed ability
test").
64. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976) ("It appears beyond doubt by
now that there is no single method for appropriately validating employment tests for their relation-
ship to job performance."); Connecticut v, Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-53 & n. 12 (1981) (rejecting bot-
tom-line defense of Guidelines after addressing issue of "job-related tests," but failing to mention
validation).
65. See, eg., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431-36 (1975) (setting rigid stan-
dards for validating test while claiming "appropriate standard of proof for job relatedness has not
been clarified until today"); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court will
consider construct validity only after a showing that proof of criterion validity is infeasible). See
generally Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 394-96 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing
difficulties of strict validation under Albemarle).
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the Guidelines. 66 It is important to note, however, that even though the
method of validation fluxes, the requirement that validation occur does
not.
III. BIOCHEMICAL DISCRIMINATION
Under the disparate impact theory a plaintiff need not prove why a
test is discrminatory. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
only make the statistical showing required in that particular jurisdiction.
As this note discusses below, the disparate impact analysis applies to bio-
chemical tests. 67 Thus, when an employer uses a biochemical test as a
pass/fail barrier to employment, a plaintiff need only show that the test
excludes a disproportional number of a protected class, not how the test
excludes them. Once a plaintiff makes this showing, the employer must
articulate a business justification for the biochemical test. Because of a
biochemical test's potential inaccuracy, however, an employer must also
prove the accuracy of a biochemical test.
A biochemical test might have a disparate impact on the members of
a protected class for a number of reasons, but the most troubling is that
the test itself may subtly discriminate regardless of the employment pol-
icy it enforces. For example, it is possible that some substance peculiar
to the physiology of a given race may be cross-reactive and thereby cause
false positives in common screening tests like the RIA or EMIT.68 Ac-
66. Either content, construct or criterion methods of validation are available as alternative ap-
proaches under the Guidelines. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247 n.13. The circuit courts have accepted the
Guidelines as expert advice, but not as binding authority. See, eg., Conteras v. City of Los Angeles,
656 F.2d 1267, 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); see also Thompson &
Christiansen, Court Acceptance of Uniform Guidelines Provision: The Bottom Line and the Search for
Alternatives, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 587, 598-602 (1983); Booth & Mackay, Legal Constraints on
Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29 EMORY L.J. 121, 141, 164-65 (1980).
The key point is that, while the courts need not accept the Guidelines as a standard for validat-
ing biotests, they should because such acceptance would promote the efficiency, predictability and
equity that comes from rigid but reproducible scientific and professional rules.
67. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
68. Dr. James Woodford, a forensic chemist, advanced a "melanin theory" of cross-reactivity.
The theory was used by fired black police cadets to challenge the accuracy of urine drug testing by
police officials. Lindsey, Worker Drug Test Provoking Debate, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
According to this theory, melanin, a dark skin pigment, can break down into a substance that causes
false positives in marijuana urine tests, increasing the risk of racial bias. Ia The theory inspired the
ACLU to bring a case in Cleveland. Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274, 285 (N.D.
Ohio 1986) (finding Woodford's theory to be unreliable without further "creditable and authoritative
data."), rev'd mem, 834 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1987).
Woodford's theory is incorrect on several grounds. First, although melanin is dispersed differ-
ently in blacks and whites, blacks and whites have about the same number of melanin cells or mela-
nocytes. Warshauer & Steinbaugh, Sunlight and Protection of the Skin, 27 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN,
June 1983, at 109, 110. Second, even if there were a difference in the number of melanin cells, the
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cording to one study, low-risk populations-such as caucasian women
and Asians-might have a false positive rate as high as 88.7%.69 The
study theorizes that the Western blot confirmation tests will be accurate
in 71.8% of cases.70
Biochemical tests may also reflect socioeconomic patterns of drug
use and AIDS infection. It is well-documented that AIDS is more preva-
lining of the urinary tract would contain almost no melanin. See GRAY'S ANATOMY 43 (36th ed.
1980). Third, a study conducted by Roche Diagnostic Systems, makers of the RIA test, indicated no
interference or cross-reactivity by melanin or its metabolite 5-hydroxyindole. RADIOIMMUNOASSAY
TRAINING PROGRAM FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE TESTING ON THE RELATIVE REACTIVITY, SPECIFIC-
rrY AND CROSS REACnvrrY OF THE ABUSCREEN REAGENT SYSTEM (June 30, 1985). Fourth, no
interference was found in one published study under the GC-MS test. ElSohly, Jones, ElSohly &
Stanford, Analysis of the Major Metabolite of Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in Urine" V. Specificity
of the Assay with Respect to Indole Carboxylic Acids, 9 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 190, 191
(1985).
While Woodford's theory is suspect, it is possible that some other ethnically characteristic sub-
stances might cause one ethinic group to test falsely positive more than another. For example,
blacks and Hispanics might have a greater tendency to test positive because they excrete higher (or
perhaps different) levels of MDH and lysozyme in their urine. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 312.
Indeed, several molecules have ethnically idiosyncratic patterns of occurrence, accounting for
cetain well-known genetic diseases. American blacks characteristically have a 1:600 chance of ac-
quiring sickle cell anemia, with a 1:12 chance of having the partial defect, the sickle cell trait. Lubin
& Mentzen, Sickle Cell Disease, in PEDIATRICS 1068, 1072 (A. Randolph 17th ed. 1982).
Another ethnically characteristic biochemical alteration is thalassemia, also due to a single gene
deletion. Id. at 1074. Alpha-Thalassemia is most common in Southeast Asians, but "is found in 2 to
7 percent of American black newborns." Id. B-Thalassemia occurs in more than five percent of
Italians, Greeks, Sardinians, Sicilians, Indians and Southeast Asians. Id. Thalassemia may result in
such complications as severe anemia, growth retardation, organ damage, and fatal cardiac failure.
Id. at 1075. By contrast, tha Tay-Sachs disease-also due to an enzyme deficiency--strikes
Ashkenazi Jews and is characterized by multisystem defects. Brady, Sphingolipidoses, in PEDIAT-
RICS, supra, at 311, 316-317.
Over 100 million people throughout the world suffer from the G6PD deficiency. Lubin &
Mentzer, Abnormalities of Erythrocyte Metabolism, in PEDIATRICS, supra, at 1082, 1083. Ironically,
the EMIT d.a.u. assay for marijuana uses the glucose 6 phosphate dehydrogenate enzyme (G6PDH)
in its inferential chain. EMIT Cannabinoid User's Guide (Feb. 1986); letter from SYVA to laborato-
ries (July 1986). G6PD deficiency is uncommon in non-Mediterranean Caucasians. Lubin & Ment-
zer, supra, at 1083. The deficiency affects over one percent of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern
males. It affects five percefit of Chinese males and ten percent of American black males. Id. While
there is no scientifically established link between false positives in biochemical tests and these en-
zyme deficiencies, it would be advisable to keep factors such as these in mind when evaluating future
biotests for their discriminatory potential. These dangers of discrimination underscore the need for
strict professional standards of validations, in accord with section 703(h).
69. See Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 23, at 263. These differences trace to the fact that
differing prevalences affect predictive value. The false-positive rate might be the same in the low-risk
and the high-risk population. But because more people would be uninfected in the low-risk popula-
tion, a greater percentage of the positives would be false positive than in the high-risk population.
See C. PIERCE & D. VAN DEVEER, AIDS: ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 142-44 (1988) (describing
predictive value, preference and false positives); Ransohoff & Feinstein, Problems of Spectrum and
Bias in Evaluating the Efficacy of Diagnostic, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 929, 926-27 (1978) (same).
70. Hoyt, Finnigan, Nee, Shults & Butler, Drug Testing in the Workplace-Are Methods Le-
gally Defensible?, 258 J. A.M.A. 504, 507 (1987).
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lent among blacks and hispanics than among other racial groups. 71 Be-
cause AIDS strikes certain groups with greater frequency, an AIDS
screening test might be discriminatory in effect if what the test purports
to measure is not job-related. 72 Also, in certain locales, marijuana use
rates among a minority group may exceed the rates of other groups.
Non-user minorities in these locales have a greater likelihood of passive
exposure to marijuana smoke.73 These examples are only possible expla-
nations for a statistical instance of disparate impact. Under Griggs, how-
ever, the cause of the disparity would be irrelevant.
Confirmation tests greatly reduce the potential for biochemical dis-
crimination present at the screening test level. The GC-MS test for mari-
juana effectively eliminates most cross-reactive substances.74 In addition,
if the GC-MS test is preceded by a screening test that raises the cutoff
level for positive results to 100 nanograms per milliliter, the probability
of detecting passive exposure or off-duty use is minimized.75 Likewise, if
cutoff levels for the ELISA test for AIDS are raised in low-risk popula-
tions and the ELISA test is confirmed with the Western blot assay, the
numbers of false positives decrease. 76 Even if an AIDS biochemical test
is positive, however, an employer would need to prove that a positive test
result is job-related. Such proof would be difficult unless the patient were
afflicted with debilitating AIDS encephalopathy or brain disease.77 A
positive AIDS test without such accompanying manifestations would
probably not be sufficiently job-related since the majority of research in-
71. A CDC report emphasizes the disproportionate occurrence of AIDS in blacks and Hispan-
ics, especially women and children. CDC, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Among
Black and Hispanics-United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 655, 655-66
(1986); see also Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 252 (1986). Likewise, a survey involving screening for military
recruits replicated these results, showing the following rates: blacks (3.9/1000), other nonwhites
(2.6/1000) and whites (0.9/1000). CDC, Human T-Lynphotropic Virus Type II/Lymphadenopathy-
Associated Virus Antibody Prevalence in U.S. Military Recruit Applicants, 35 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. 421, 421-24 (1986). These later prevalence rates are significant because they
show that over four times as many black military recruits are infected as white recruits (0.9 x 4 =
3.6).
72. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of the symptoms of AIDS that
might and might not affect an employee's job performance.
73. See 1 (4) NIDA STATISTICAL SERIES: ANNUAL DATA 70-104 (1984) (Federal data suggest
that marijuana use rates are related to socioeconomic status and there will be heavier concentrations
of use in low to lower middle classes. In certain urban areas, minority use rates will far exceed
nonminority rates, but the reverse will be true in other cities.).
74. See DiGregorio & Sterling, supra note 23, at 211; Gold & Dackis, supra note 23, at 20-22.
75. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
76. See DiGregorio & Sterling, supra note 23, at 210; Willette, supra note 26, at 2.
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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dicates that the disease cannot be transmitted by casual contact.78 Only
in jobs involving health care might an AIDS test be job-related, although
an employer could make an argument that AIDS testing is job-related
because of the potential rise in health insurance premiums.
IV. BIOCHEMICAL TESTS AS EMPLOYEE SELECTION DEVICES
Griggs and its progeny establish two strands of disparate impact
doctrine: the selection policy strand and the professionally developed
testing strand. This section discusses both strands and explains why bio-
chemical tests comfortably fit within traditional disparate impact defini-
tions of employee selection tests. Finally, this section distinguishes a test
from the policy it implements. When the accuracy of the test itself is
called into question, an employer seeking to prove its job-relatedness
must offer evidence of the test's accuracy and validate the test.
A. The Selection Policy Strand.
In several decisions, the Supreme Court has applied the disparate
impact doctrine to non-test selection devices. These decisions typically
involve an employer's policy requiring employees to meet specified crite-
ria or possess certain qualities. These decisions differ from testing deci-
sions because the method of assessing or measuring the employer's
requirement is not in question; it is the policy that the employer must
justify. Consequently, in these decisions, the Court has not required vali-
dation under the Uniform Guidelines.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 79 the Court considered a non-test selection
policy-Alabama statutes that established minimum height and weight
requirements for applicants for the position of prison guard.80 The re-
quirements would have excluded 41.13% of American women while ex-
cluding less than 1% of men.81 The Court did not require proof of the
accuracy of a weight scale or of a yardstick; these were implicitly ac-
cepted as valid and accurate. The Court scrutinized thepolicy of requir-
ing a minimum weight and height, not the methods of measurement.
The employer argued that the policy selected applicants on the basis of
strength.8 2
78. See S. BRODER, AIDS: MODERN CONCEPTS AND THERAPAUTiC CHALLENGES 84 (1987);
C. PIERCE & D. VAN DEVEER, supra note 69, at 3-5; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 1-36 (1986).
79. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
80. IaL at 323-24.
81. Id. at 329-30.
82. Id. at 331.
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The Court held that the employer had not shown the job-relatedness
of the selection policy for two reasons. First, the Court reasoned that the
employer could have used an alternative test that directly measured
strength and defensive capacity.8 3 Second, in a footnote, the Court
stated, "A discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be nec-
essary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII chal-
lenge."' 84 The Court did not require validation under the Uniform
Guidelines, but the alternative test rationale is considered in the
Guidelines.85
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 86 the Court also con-
sidered a non-test selection policy. In Beazer, the employer prohibited
the hiring or promotion of workers using any narcotic,87 including the
legal therapeutic agent methadone, prescribed to treat heroin addiction.88
When the employer discovered that employees were enrolled in metha-
done maintenance programs, the employees were dismissed. 89 The em-
ployer also used urine testing as a method of discovering drug abuse on
the job.90 The urine test was one mode of implementing what was pri-
marily a selection policy rather than a pass/fail barrier to employment.
The Transit Authority justified the blanket policy as necessary for the
safe and efficient performance of work that could potentially endanger
the public.9 ' The Supreme Court agreed that the "legitimate employ-
ment goals of safety and efficiency" justified the employment policy.92
The selection policy in Beazer implicated Title VII because the
plaintiffs produced statistics showing that more blacks and hispanics
than whites are involved in methadone maintenance programs. 93 The
Beazer Court, however, rejected the statistical basis of the plaintiffs'
claim.94 Arguably, the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie claim of
83. Id. at 332. The Court, referring the defendants to the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1976), said that a test that measures strength di-
rectly, "fairly administered, would fully satisfy the standards of Title VII because it would be one
that 'measure[s] the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.'" 433 U.S. at 332 & n.15
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 425, 436 (1971)).
84. 433 U.S. at 330 n.14.
85. See id. at 332 & n.15 (giving the Court's only reference to the Guidelines); 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(1987).
86. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
87. Id. at 571-72.
88. Id. at 573-75.
89. Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
90. Positive urine tests for methadone, however, were not among the criteria used to identify
suspected violators to the transit authority medical director. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 585 n.26.
91. Beazer, 399 F. Supp. at 1036.
92. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31.
93. Id. at 579.
94. Id. at 584-87 (holding that the statistics presented "do not prove a violation of Title VII").
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disparate impact, and the Court did not formally address the issue of
proving the job-relatedness of the policy. If Beazer did not present a
claim of disparate impact, the language the Court devoted to the job-
relatedness issue95 is dicta. In any event, the Court's dicta indicate a less
demanding standard for proving job-relatedness in the non-test selection
policy context.
Beazer may settle the question of whether the policy of excluding
drug users from employment is related to the job. But Beazer does not
address urine testing; the proper standard for proving the job-relatedness
of a potentially inaccurate test is still validation under the Uniform
Guidelines.
B. The Testing Strand.
Griggs and Albemarle Paper v. Moody 96 are the controlling decisions
When the selection device is a test. Although in Griggs and Albemarle
the Court relied on the EEOC Guidelines, in subsequent decisions the
Court has shown less deference to the Guidelines. 97 Nevertheless, Griggs
and Albemarle are still good law. Thus, while no longer entitled to great
deference, the Uniform Guidelines continue to guide courts and employ-
ers when the selection device in question is a test.
Washington v. Davis 98 is the only Supreme Court decision involving
a selection test that does not require a demanding standard of validation.
In Davis, the District of Columbia police department required applicants
to pass a written examination measuring verbal and communicative
skills. 99 The police department argued that a positive correlation be-
tween test results and performance in a training program satisfied the
job-relatedness requirement. 1°0 The Court found this justification suffi-
cient to validate the test.10' The Davis holding, however, is of limited
value in the Title VII context. The Court grounded its decision on the
95. Id. at 587 ("At best, respondents' statistical showing is weak; even if it is capable of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination (and the rule's application to methadone users) it is
assuredly rebutted by TA's demonstration that its narcotics rule is 'job related.' ").
96. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
97. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453 n.12 (1982) (declining to defer to the Guide-
lines); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-43 (1976) (applying the Stridmore v. Swift,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), standard on the role of interpretative rulings); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 263 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 229.
99. Id. at 234-35.
100. Id. at 235-36.
101. Id. at 250-52.
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plaintiffs' constitutional claim and not Title VII.102 Most lower courts
have limited the application of Davis, requiring more than correlation
between test scores and success in training for validation.103
C. Biochemical Tests as Selection Tests.
Disparate impact decisions of the testing strand have typically in-
volved paper-and-pencil tests such as those in Griggs and Albemarle.
Supreme Court decisions, however, have in no way limited employee se-
lection devices to paper-and-pencil testing;a°4 the Court has consistently
suggested a broad definition of testing. In Griggs, the Court referred to
"testing or measuring procedures,"105 suggesting that the scope of selec-
tion testing extends beyond psychological aptitude or ability tests to
other measuring procedures. Moreover, in Albemarle the Court ex-
panded the meaning of testing to include employee "tests or selection
devices," 10 6 again implying that employee selection tests were not limited
to paper-and-pencil examinations. In Albemarle Justice Stewart also im-
pliedly affirmed the view that the term "testing devices" includes both
"testing [and] measuring procedures."1 0 7
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has shown some deference to-
wards selection tests under the EEOC Guidelines. The Guidelines
broadly define tests or selection procedures to include measurements of
"physical" requirements.10 8 The Guidance Document to the Guidelines
102. Id. at 238-39 ("We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims
of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we
decline to do so today.").
103. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 244-47 (2d Cir. 1980) (Davis
Court not interpreting "job-relatedness" as defined in Title VII; even if applicable to Title VII deter-
mination, Davis limited to entry-level tests designed to weed out applicants lacking minimal skills
necessary to complete training program), cert. denied as to Title VII claim, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983);
Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1980) (unlike Davis, there was no
demonstration of a correlation between test performance and job performance in sheriff's depart-
ment), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018, 1023 (4th Cir.)
(Davis confined to fifth amendment principles; Title VII does not require proof of intentional dis-
crimination), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
104. For example, Justice Stewart speaks of validating "testing or measuring procedures" in
Albemarle. 422 U.S. at 426 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436) (emphasis added). The conjunction
does not seem to be a rhetorical device of repetition, but seems to indicate that types of measure-
ments other than paper-and-pencil tests need to be validated. The EEOC Guidelines and their Gui-
dance Document indicate that validation will apply to measurements such as physical dimensions
and biotests. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
105. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not re-
deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms which operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minor-
ity groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
106. 422 U.S. at 425.
107. Id. at 426 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436).
108. The term "selection procedure" includes devices that measure "physical educational, and
work experience requirements" See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (1987) (emphasis added). The Guide-
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also supports a broad interpretation of testing, defining employee testing
as "selection procedures." 10 9 Selection procedures include "physical re-
quirements" and "physical job requirements."' 10 Biochemical tests,
therefore, come within current Supreme Court definitions of selection
testing. Because of their inherent inaccuracy, biochemical tests may con-
tribute to unintentional discrimination just as easily as paper-and-pencil
aptitude tests.111
D. The Relationship of Tests and Policies.
In general, a test seeks to measure a specific quality or characteris-
tic. A measurement of a person's vision, height, or weight is a test, of
sorts. The connection, however, between the quantitative measurement
and the inference drawn from the measurement is so close that one can-
not conceive of the two as anything but the same thing. This sort of test
is self-validating.
The tests in Dothard v. Rawlinson " 2-weight and height-were
self-validating. The Court did not require proof of the validity of a
weight scale or of a yardstick. These tests were implicitly accepted as
valid and accurate. The Court scrutinized thepolicy of requiring a mini-
mum weight and height, not the methods of measurement.
lines define "discrimination" as the "use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on
the hiring, promotion, or other employment or membership opportunities of any race, sex, or ethnic
group." 29 C.F.R. 1607.3(A) (1987).
109. A document entitled Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11,995
(1979) [hereinafter Guidance Document] further clarifies the meaning of selection procedures or
selection devices:
5. Q. Do the Guidelines apply only to written tests?
A. No. They apply to all selection procedures used to make employment decisions, in-
cluding interviews, review of experience or education from application forms, work sam-
ples,physicalrequirements, and evaluations of performance. Sections 2B and 16Q, and see
Question 6.
6. Q. What practices are covered by the Guidelines?
A. The Guidelines apply to employee selection procedures which are used in making
employment decisions, such as hiring, retention, promotion, transfer, demotion, dismissal
or referral. Section 2B. Employee selection procedures include job requirements (physical,
education, experience), and evaluation of applicants or candidates on the basis of applica-
tion forms, interviews, performance tests, paper and pencil tests, performance in training
programs or probationary periods, and any other procedures used to make an employment
decision whether administered by the employer or by an employment agency. See Section
2B.
Id. at 11,997.
110. Id.
111. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct.
2777, 2783-87 (1988), extended disparate impact testing to subjective employment practices. This
extension of Griggs and Albemarle buttresses the above argument for considering biochemical tests
as objective selection tests.
112. 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see also supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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Other tests and the inferences drawn from them are not so closely
related. Before a test such as a scholastic aptitude test achieves credibil-
ity and efficacy it must be psychologically valid. This validity is often
dependent on certain underlying cultural and social assumptions about
what is considered intelligence or academic skill. In the employment
context, they are typically assumptions about safety, efficiency and profit
maximization. These assumptions are why the Griggs and Albemarle
Courts were concerned with the validity of the paper-and-pencil tests.
Not only must the quality measured be job-related, but the method of
measuring that quality must be accurate. Otherwise, job-relatedness be-
comes irrelevant.
Most importantly, a test is something quite distinct from the policy
it implements. When the two are used in tandem, a court must regard
the test and the policy as two discrete elements; the test must be accurate,
and the policy it enforces must be job-related. Typically, validation of
the test-proof of its accuracy-will also justify the policy as one related
to the job. This is especially true when an employer uses the content
variety of validation under the Uniform Guidelines. In the case of bio-
chemical tests, however, the potential for inaccuracy compels a two-part
analysis: first, an employer must prove the accuracy of the test, and sec-
ond, the employer must prove the validity of the policy the test
implements.
V. VALIDATING BIOCHEMICAL TESTS.
A. The Advantages of Validation Under the Uniform Guidelines.
Because of the potential inaccuracies, courts should require employ-
ers to validate biochemical tests under a system of demanding and relia-
ble rules to ensure their accuracy and job-relatedness. In Davis the Court
stated: "[T]here is no single method for appropriately validating employ-
ment tests for their relationship to job performance."'1 13 In spite of the
Davis aberration, Griggs and Albemarle are binding in the testing con-
text. The Uniform Guidelines must serve as at least the basis for validat-
ing biochemical tests.
The Uniform Guidelines offer several advantages as a method of val-
idation. For example, the Guidelines provide administrative expertise
and expert study in the technical and specialized area of testing. The
Guidelines are predictable and reliable; courts can point to the same ob-
jective standard in each case of biochemical testing. Once an employer
has validated a biochemical test under the Guidelines, she can use the
113. 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976).
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test with confidence. Without a consistent method, the employer would
have less confidence in her selection device and might forego drug or
AIDS testing altogether. A truly nondiscriminatory test can increase the
productivity and safety of the employer's business.
Other advantages are administrability and efficiency. Courts and
employers alike can consult the Guidelines rather than groping for some
vague notion of safety or efficiency. If courts allow only a safety and
efficiency standard and do not focus on the accuracy of the test, the po-
tential for discrimination on the chemical level will always be present.
Tests of confirmation must be used in addition to a validation study to
eliminate the possibility of chemical discrimination.
Finally, the Guidelines can make validation easier for an employer.
The Guidelines allow "transportation" of the validity studies of
others.114 That way an employer would not have to conduct his own
expensive study if another employer had already done a similar study.
Also, the Guidelines allow an employer to replace the challenged test
with a nondiscriminatory alternative procedure.
B. Validation: A Paradigm.
An employer should conduct a validation study before implement-
ing a biochemical test as a selection device. If a court finds that the em-
ployer has not conducted a validation study, it should compel validation
under the Uniform Guidelines.
A court that is assessing the sufficiency of an employer's validation
study should begin by determining whether the employer retained the
necessary data and records. First, a court must require evidence of the
accuracy of the test-proof of the use of confirmation tests, records of
cutoff levels and other technical elements of the test. Second, a court
should require records of test results.' 15 The results, should be tabulated
for minorities and non-minorities. Third, a court should require the em-
ployer to retain data on the safety-sensitivity of the employees' job. 116
Next the court should determine whether the alternatives of trans-
portation or modification are available. Transportation refers to the bor-
rowing of a validity study conducted by another employer, provided the
114. "Transportability" refers to the use of validity studies not conducted by the user. See 29
C.F.R. § 1607(A) (1987). Transporting the validiiy studies of another employer or an independent
scientific group to a similar work setting avoids costs connected with validating. Conceivably, if a
test became generally acceptable, there would be virtually no cost in validating by transporting.
115. The test's user should maintain records which will be available for inspection to determine
the presence of adverse impact. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(A) (1987). The records should indicate such
categories as race, sex and ethnicity. Cf. id § 1607.4(B).
116. Safety-sensitive jobs would require criteria of "low error rates" and "high productivity."
See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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tests and job categories are sufficiently similar. 117 Modification refers to
the simple replacement of the discriminatory selection test with a less
discriminatory alternative.11e If transportation and modification are un-
available as alternatives, then a validation study will be necessary to re-
but the prima facie case. The validation study should be of the criterion-
related variety.' 19
When validation is necessary, the court should require initially that
the employer introduce evidence of the accuracy of the test. The method
of obtaining the sample should be noted, as well as the cutoff score used
117. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1607.7 (discussing use of validity studies conducted by another employer or
manufacturer).
118. Cf. id. § 1607.6(A), (B)(2) (discussing modification or replacement with less discriminatory
alternatives).
119. The Guidelines define and describe three important varieties of validation studies: crite-
rion-related validity studies, content validity studies, and construct (trait) validity studies. Id.
§ 1607.14. In addition to these, an employer may use "other professionally acceptable techniques."
Id. § 1607.14.
Criterion-related studies simply correlate performance on selection tests with any number of
criteria that are presumed to measure successful work performance. Examples of criteria include
"production rate, error rate, tardiness, absenteeism, and length of service." Id. § 1607.14(B)(3).
Criterion-related studies may be either predictive, dealing with performance on criteria longitudi-
nally (i.e., over time), or concurrent, dealing with present performance as measured by the criteria.
Id. § 1607.14(B)(4). A central requirement is differential validity; the pool of candidates for the
study must be a representative sample of the candidates normally available in the relevant job mar-
ket. Id. In other words, the candidates studied should represent a cross-section of the races, ethnic
groups and sexes in the employable population. Any correlations of criteria to performance also
should be statistically significant. Id § 1607.14(B)(5) (setting the significant level of correlation at
the 0.05 level of significance, meaning a probability of no more than one in twenty that the correla-
tion occurred by chance). Finally, the validity study should determine whether cutoff scores (for
example, the level at which urine tests are considered positive for marijuana) are appropriately set.
rd. § 1607.14(B)(6).
A content validity study will apply to tests that measure knowledge, skills or abilities important
to performance of the job. See generally id. § 1607.14(C). The classic content-based test is a typing
examination for speed when the job in question is for a typist. Practicable tests for these purposes
would be tests of performance.
Construct (trait) validity studies use scores on tests to enforce a policy. An intelligence test can
function as a construct-related test. These studies depend on the identification or development of a
test that measures or allows the inference of the construct. See id § 1607.14(D)(2) (describing the
necessary "job analysis"). Examples of constructs would include traits such as apathy, anti-sociality,
tendency to break the law, tendency to use illegal substances, or tendency to fraternize with
criminals. Cf id. (job analysis should reflect the "work behavior(s) required for successful perform-
ance of the job"). If an employer could show that urine tests for marijuana correlated positively to
one of these traits, then the test would validly imply the negative traits under construct validation.
In any case, the Guidelines establish an important limitation on the use of construct validity studies:
until the professional literature provide!; more guidance on the use of construct validity studies, such
studies will not be acceptable unless preceded by transportable criterion-related validity studies. Id
§ 1607.14(D)(4)(a). Therefore, an employer would need to have proven that a positive urine test was
validated to the construct of criminality or drug use by using studies drawn from the professional
literature.
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to call a result "positive."12 0 A cutoff score set too low may invalidate
the job-relatedness of the test by introducing the possibility of detecting
cross-reactive compounds or the off-duty use of marijuana in the case of
urine testing.12 1 The court should ascertain whether the employer used a
more specific test to confirm the screening test.122
The employer should undertake a job analysis for each affected job
category. This analysis should describe duties, safety-sensitivity, work
behaviors, and work outcomes of the job. 123 Furthermore, specific crite-
ria for each job category should be named and rated, including but not
limited to production rate, error rate, tardiness, absenteeism and length
of service.124 These normative categories should be tabulated for both
minorities and non-minorities, so that the requirement for differential
validation can be met. 2 5 Steps should be taken to formalize these crite-
ria on standardized forms in an effort to minimize supervisor (i.e.,
"rater") bias. 126
A court might then determine whether employees submitted to a
voluntary program of random drug testing. The employees chosen
should reflect a random cross-section or representative sample of ethnic
and racial categories as well as positions in the line of career
progression. 127
Statisticians should assess the correlation between job performance
and marijuana levels in the urine or the numerical value of the AIDS
test. If a positive correlation between measurements exists, then the em-
ployer may present these findings to the court as evidence that the bio-
chemical test is in compliance with the Guidelines. 128
Even if a validation study establishes the accuracy of a biochemical
test, the test still may not be job-related. This is especially true in the
120. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(6) (discuss-
ing cutoffs).
121. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
123. This study would be a criterion-related study of the kind described in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.9(A). See supra note 118.
124. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(3).
125. Id. §§ 1607.4(A), (B).
126. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 432 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(B)(3), (4) (1970), which deal with standardizing appraisal forms and scrutinizing superviso-
rial ratings to prevent bias).
127. Cf id. § 1607.14(B)(4).
128. Id. § 1607.14(B)(5) (A criterion is related to performance if the relationship is statistically
significant; that is, the probability of the positive correlation occurring by chance is no more than
one in twenty.). Ideally, this criterion-related study should be replaced by a construct validity study
when the professional literature is sufficiently developed on the subject. See supra note 121 and
accompanying text (reviewing various constructs appropriate for urine testing under 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.14(D)).
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case of AIDS testing; the majority of research indicates that, contrary to
popular wisdom, one cannot contract AIDS through casual contact.1 29
An employee infected with AIDS will perform at a similar physical level
until the later stages when brain disease develops. Therefore, even with
high cutoff levels and the Western blot assay, AIDS testing may not be
job-related except in certain health-related professions and occupations
such as the armed forces, where blood donations are required. Valida-
tion eliminates the possibility of discrimination and allows the necessary
testing in health-sensitive positions.
If an employer proves the accuracy of a urine test for drugs, the
employer can probably justify the test on the grounds of safety and effi-
ciency. This rationale is persuasive in safety-sensitive positions, but in
non-safety-sensitive positions, a urine test may not be directly related to
job performance. The oversensitivity of urine tests makes them espe-
cially problematic in non-safety-sensitive positions. An employee could
test positive weeks after ingestion of the drug.130 Arguably, what an em-
ployee does during his off-duty hours is a private matter and is not re-
lated to job performance. On the other hand, an employee's off-duty
conduct may reflect on his business, perhaps damaging goodwill. The
inquiry into the job-relatedness of urine testing, is thus fact specific, and
can proceed only when the employer has verified the accuracy of the
urine test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employee urine testing should increase disparate impact litigation
under Title VII. Socioeconomic patterns of drug use coupled with pas-
sive inhalation and the potential for cross-reactivity may cause some eth-
nic groups to suffer unduly from biochemical drug testing. Given the
proper use of statistical data plaintiffs may state a prima facie case and
force employers to validate biochemical tests. Cutoff levels set too low
will detect passive exposure, thereby differentially excluding some from
hiring or promotions.
The proliferation of AIDS testing in the employment setting also
should bring an increase in Title VII litigation. In the first instance,
blacks and hispanics are afflicted with AIDS at higher rates than whites.
Simply because individuals test positive for the AIDS virus does not im-
ply that performance on the job will be affected or that unsafe conditions
will result. Only in the late stages of AIDS would emaciation or en-
cephalopathy impair job performance. Likewise, employees with AIDS
129. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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would not create unsafe conditions for other employees or the public
since the virus is not contagious through casual contact. Furthermore,
most test results of the ELISA screen for AIDS will be false positive in
low-risk populations. If an employer tested protected members of a low-
risk population and these applicants were excluded on the basis of uncon-
firmed ELISA screens, then a claim for disparate impact could follow.
The heightened potential for Title VII litigation underscores the im-
portance of defenses for employers. If biochemical testing is classified as
an employee selection policy, then the employer need simply articulate a
single nondiscriminatory reason why the policy promotes safety and effi-
ciency. If biochemical testing is classified as an employee selection test,
then the employer must either validate, transport validation, or modify
the protocols for biochemical testing. The case law, the EEOC Guide-
lines and the Guidance Document all support the conclusion that bio-
chemical testing should be classified as an employee selection test.
Furthermore, analysis of biochemical testing as selection testing offers
several policy advantages. First, validation studies will minimize the ef-
fects of discriminatory biochemical tests and discriminatory uses of valid
biochemical tests. Second, with ready knowledge of a biochemical test-
ing protocol's validity an employer could make employment decisions
more confidently. Finally, validation serves the goals of safety, efficiency
and profit maximization. A valid selection test can benefit all; the em-
ployer is allowed to pursue valid business goals while society protects the
rights of all categories of citizens.
Andrew Ayers Martin
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